The procedures for conducting life cycle cost analysis and trade studies are discussed. Although the focus is on life cycle costing, the procedures discussed are applicable to any analysis. Types of effort discussed include the development of a life cycle cost model, level of repair analysis, trade studies, and "baselines". "Lessons learned" examples of problems and pit-falls from past programs are also provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Past experience has identified the need t o carefully structure, monitor, and review contracted life cycle cost analysis and trade studies. This paper poignantly discusses two programs as examples of "lessons learned". Program "A" deals with a munition and its storage container. The maintenance concept is to annually test (with a portable suitcase size testor) part of the fleet and to return failed munitions in their container to the depot for repair. The two-way shipping cost for this munition is less than two percent (2%) of the munition flyaway cost. One of the issues to be addressed in program "A" was "cannibalization". This concept was not the normal USAF definition for cannibalization: removing functioning (serviceable) items that are not available from supply from one or two Not Mission Capable Due to Supply (NMCS) aircraft (these aircraft are NMCS due to other failed/unserviceable items) in order to maximize the fleet availability. The "cannibalization" concept used in this program for failed munitions was an option to ship only some of the subsystems back to the depot (cannibalize) and discard the remaining munition parts. The other options for failed munitions were to discard the entire round (at base level) or to ship the whole munition (in its container) back to the depot. This paper is declared a work o f the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
The first step in the preparation process is to state the question(s) ("statement of analysis need") to be addressed in the study and analysis. These "needs" must be clearly defined within the context of the reason and rationale for the study. If this "statement" is vague or ambiguous, the study is likely to go off on a tangent and the results are apt to be a surprise or not address the "real" issues.
Program "A" was a trade study to perform logistics repair/discard analysis of the air vehicles. The Statement of Work (SOW) included the following tasking: "Identify appropriate modeling criteria to conduct a comparative cost analysis of repairing a defective weapon, discarding it with a replacement, or cannibalizing i t with a replacement. The model shall include the effects of system warranty provisions.Io We will see later how this vague warranty tasking was implemented.
Program I0Blr was for the development of a Cost Estimating Relationship (CER) model for subsystem trade studies. The ALT review of this model resulted in concluding that a CER model such as this is more applicable t o total system budgetary estimates than subsystem trade studies as was the stated model objective.
Once the study "analysis needs" are defined, the second step is to make certain assumptions to limit the scope of the analysis to an appropriate level (e.g. affordable, time constrained). Assumptions must be made to constrain or even make possible the analysis. The following are some examples of scope limiting assumptions:
What "real world" operational scenario is to be assessed? e.g. European theater or Continental US? Air-to-Air and/or Air-to-Ground? Operations from a Main Operating Base or from dispersed operating bases?
Wartime or Peacetime operations?
Is theater level analysis required or will base level only be sufficient to address the question(s)?
If system availability is an issue, is only the supply system to be considered or is maintenance time/skill level also required in the analysis?
What is the utilization rate? Hours/day? Hours/month? Hourslyear?
What is the life of the system? Does the utilization rate have a major impact on the design life?
How many years for operating and support costs?
Is phase-in an issue?
Does the utilization rate change over time?
What force structure (e.g. wing, squadron, flight, or single aircraft) is to be analyzed?
The above questions address only a small sample of scope limiting assumptions. Care must be taken that these assumptions do not violate the real world being analyzed or ignore the question(s) to be assessed. For example, on program "A", one of the assumptions was that the warranty cost paid for all repairs during the warranty period. In actuality, the warranty only covered repair of failures that exceeded the specification (exceeded the allowable failures). This scope limiting assumption caused the results to be of little value in assessing the level of repair for the system and subsystems.
Program "Bl' also contained some questionable assumptions. This model was not design sensitive beyond whether or not fuel control was used. For similar engine configurations, making trade-offs among several engines with this model will be difficult. The primary cost element is scheduled depot maintenance associated with recertification. The recertification period and costs should be required input to the analysis rather than ground rule assumptions.
The third step is to define the Cost Element Structure (CES) to be utilized in the analysis. This CES must include the elements that contain the cost drivers for the analysis being conducted. Also this CES must be at a level of detail sufficient to answer the question(s) being addressed. If only base level maintenance time is being assessed, then depot level cost elements may not be necessary. However, if availability is being addressed, then depot level repair time and depot stockage levels affect the base level stock, and thus may cause aircraft to be Not Mission Capable due to Supply (NMCS). AFR 173-13 provides the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) approved CES for Operating and Support (O&S) costs for aircraft weapon systems and for missiles. This regulation is a good reference to insure the appropriate cost elements are included in the study and allows the flexibility to sub-indenture each element to the level necessary for visibility into alternatives.
The CES on program "A" did not include the cost elements that contained the major cost drivers for repair level analysis. The cost elements included in this analysis were: 1) warranty price (assumed repair cost), 2) shipping cost, and 3) production cost without warranty. The excluded major repair cost driven elements were: 1) base level maintenance manpower and material, 2 ) depot level maintenance manpower and material, and 3) replenishment spares. The cost of additional base level support equipment to perform repairs typically done at the depot is often a major cost driver. The additional training cost of base level personnel to perform depot type repairs may also be a major cost driver. If base level repair is not performed, additional base level stockage (additional cost) may be required to meet the system availability requirements. The analysis in study "A" did not address any of these repair level driven cost elements.
The CES on program 'lB'l also excluded a major cost driving elementfuel cost. Differences in fuel requirements (i.e., type and amount) were not accounted for in the model. This becomes more critical when recertification requires that the fuel be replaced or reconditioned or if the missiles are operated during captive carry, as some are.
The fourth step is to define the methodologies and/or models that are appropriate for the study.
proprietary methodologies or models should be used. If the methodology or a model is to be developed as part of the study tasking, this methodology/model, including complete documentation, must be a deliverable to the government under the contract. Inherent with any methodology o r model are additional assumptions and constraints that must be understood in order to be able to utilize the results. A model assumption such as a constant failure rate may be inappropriate in addressing the impact of reliability growth. Because many "what if" exercises require tailoring of the methodology/models, "black box" proprietary models inhibit the flexibility of the government and are therefore unacceptable. Another difficulty with proprietary models is the "non-releasibility" of these models t o other contractors which eliminates their usefullness for contractual tasking and for source selections. This "non-releasibility" is a very important point.
The choice of the appropriate methodology/model is an extremely important and challenging task. The methodology/models appropriate for an aircraft system (most failures occur during operations) are generally not appropriate for missiles/munitions (most failures occur during dormant storage). Peacetime operations stockage models (such as the Logistic Support Cost model) are usually not appropriate for Wartime Reserve Materials (WRM) calculations (dyna-METRIC is recommended). The methodology/model must be applicable and sensitive to the analysis being performed.
The warranty cost (repair cost) methodology developed in program "A" did not vary this cost with the number of failures. Instead the warranty cost for the total fleet was held constant (independent of the number of failures). However, failure rate (and therefore the number of failures) was one of the parameters that was varied in this study to define different levels of repair for various failure rates. The proprietary model was not a deliverable under this contract and the documentation of the methodology was meager. The study conclusions only made sense if the assumptions and methodology were acceptable. The previous assumptions for study "A" resulted in the following as one conclusion: for low failure rates, discard the weapon system at base level and obtain another from production without warranty. More appropriate assumptions/methodology would have concluded that, regardless of failure rate, all failed weapon systems should be shipped to the depot for repair and/or salvage. depended upon numerous factors including inventory size, missile type, captive carry policy, and mean time between failure (MTBF) as was cited. However, the model's assumptions eliminated two of these variables (captive carry policy and mean time between failure) by assuming fixed values.
The fifth step in this structuring process is to define the sources of data to be utilized. Data inherently adds additional assumptions to the analysis. Preliminary engineering estimates for parameters (e.g. Mean Time Between Failure, Maintenance Manhours per Flight Hour) have a lower confidence level than do actual field data from test programs. HQ AFLC data collection systems rely on the accuracy of the inputs from base level maintenance and supply as well as depot level inputs. This input data is processed to obtain the final products. This processing includes making additional assumptions. For example, the data collected for a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) that is on several Mission Design Series (MDS) aircraft at a particular base may not have the LRU failures identified to each MDS. Instead these LRU failures may be allocated during processing to each MDS based on flying hours and possessed tide. Different missions (environments) for each MDS could cause different failure rates for each MDS that is not reflected by this allocation procedure. Field data is always an average value, thus, variations over time are to be expected. When large variations in these average values occur, sensitivity of the study results to these variations based on statistical analysis should be included in the analysis and the documentation.
On program "BIl, the unscheduled maintenance Program r'Blr was an Air Force only development of a cost estimating model for Air Force support of engines. However, Navy Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) based on Navy data were included. Evaluation of these "Navy CERs" for applicability to Air Force support was not possible. Additional backup information on the derivation of the cost estimating relationship (CER) used to estimate the Technical Support costs should have been included. It was not obvious why or how a Navy developed algorithm is appropriate for an Air Force application. These same comments also applied to the cost element Supply Depot Operations.
The sixth step is to establish (or task the contractor to establish) a baseline. This baseline becomes the real world reference point. For most studies this baseline is the current configuration the program office is acquiring. This baseline includes the operational concepts and the support concepts (e.g. three level maintenance). The analysis of the alternatives and sensitivity analysis are in reference to this baseline (or a derived baseline that is trackable to the reference point). A derived baseline may be an existing system or a composite system based on analogous subsystems. The following is an example of a study where a derived baseline was necessary for comparison purposes.
In the High Reliability Fighter (HRF) study, the real world baseline was a F-15C aircraft. The objective of this paper study was to improve upon the F-15C configuration. To improve upon the F-15C configuration the most reliable and lowest weight subsystems from F-l4s, F-15s, F-16s, F-18s, F-20s, AV-8s, and A-10s were included. This derived baseline (a composite aircraft) is a theoretical aircraft but is trackable to real world subsystems. The alternative design is an aircraft that incorporates new technology projected to exist in ten years that increases certain current high failure rate subsystem reliability by a factor of five (115 the number of failures) and reduces the subsystem weight by fifty percent (50%). Both the derived baseline and the alternative design are capable of performing the required mission. The alternative design will be compared to the derived baseline for a number of parameters (e.g. sortie rate, mission reliability, mission effectiveness, and survivability). These parameters are not assessed for the F-15C because this aircraft cannot perform the required mission (e.g. insufficient range due to aircraft weight and resulting limited fuel load). So, while the F-15C is the "real world" baseline, i t can not perform the required mission. Thus the derived baseline in fact becomes the program baseline and is the baseline used in system development efforts.
INTERIM REVIEWS OF THE STUDY AND ANALYSIS
Periodic reviews of the contractor's progress for the study/analysis are necessary to assure the final product addresses the questions to be answered. The preliminary results and conclusions should be reviewed in the context of the results expected when the study was initiated. Most analysis deals with situations that have been investigated before; therefore, the results can be hypothesized before conducting the analysis. For example, a current radio has a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of 100 flight hours and is supported by 3 levels of maintenance. A new radio is projected to have a MTBF of 1000 hours. Other avionic items with MTBFs of 1000 hours or greater are often supported by 2 levels of maintenance. The expected result (hypothesis) of this analysis is two-level maintenance for the new radio. If the preliminary results are not the anticipated results, additional investigation and understanding of the analysis is necessary. This is especially true when analyzing "state-of-the-art" technology or projecting future technologies.
Many of the assumptions and ttways-of-doing-business"
reflected in the historical data base and/or methodology may not apply to the new technology. For example, the new radio may incorporate Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) technology. The new radio requires less power and space (smaller volume) and weighs less than the current radio. Thus, cost per pound analysis based on historical data is probably not appropriate. The new radio contains 20 modules of 4 unique types (thus a single type of module is used 5 times in each radio). The large number of identical modules produced make the cost of an individual module very inexpensive; thus, a failed module may be condemned rather than repaired. Because the test circuitry is "designed-in" for production quality assurance, this same circuitry is used for fault verification (less than 0.5% false indication of a failure) and minimal support equipment is required. Thus historical support equipment cost factors (support equipment cost as a percent of supported hardware item cost) are probably not appropriate without adjustment. Even if the preliminary results are the same as the expected results, emphasis should be on the cost drivers. These cost drivers should be varied to quantify their impact on the results (sensitivity analysis). Sensitivity of the results to '?key" assumptions should also be investigated. The emphasis of these reviews should be on the methodology and analysis in order to understand the results and conclusions.
Program *'A" had three interim reviews before the draft final product was provided. These reviews consisted of view graph presentations and discussions. The emphasis was on the "chartsmanship" and the "wording" rather than the methodology. The methodology was discussed only in generalities except at the third meeting. Near the end of the third meeting, the methodology was provided for discussion as twenty feet of computer listing placed on the conference table. Little discussion occurred. As has been previously discussed, the program "A" results were a big surprise.
IV. REVIEW OF THE FINAL PRODUCT AND DOCulIENTATION
The purpose of the final product is to answer the questions in a formal manner. This may include a scripted view graph presentation, but should be backed up by detailed documentation that allows the reader to understand and reproduce the results. The Life Cycle CostIDesign to Cost (LCC/DTC) Data Item Description (DID) provides a good example of required documentation for studies and analysis. This DID is included in most Statements of Work (SOW) f o r engineering trade studies. Part I11 of DI-F-30203 requires the following six parts for documentation of trade studies: 1) Introduction, 2) Summary, 3 )
Description of analysis methods and special techniques, 4 ) Results, 5) Data element sources, and 6 ) Recommended areas for future cost trades. Each of these parts is discussed in more detail below.
The introduction should provide the reasodrationale for the study or analysis. An example is: "The purpose of this study is to assess the level of repair of components of system XYZ. The assessed levels of repair include the intermediate level, Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities (CIRF), and depot level." The introduction should also include a brief discussion of the expected results and how these results may impact other program elements. An example is: "The high cost for support equipment indicates that intermediate level repair is unlikely. The pipeline times for depot repair require excessive additional base level spares stockage to meet availability requirements. The CIRF concept appears to be a lower life cycle cost alternative. If CIRF is a lower LCC option, then the cost of Interim Contractor Support (ICs) may also be impacted."
The summary should provide the results of the analysis and state the recommendations. For example: "The CIRF concept has a 20% lower LCC than the next lower cost repair alternative (depot repair). The CIRF concept should also reduce the ICs cost. Even though the ICs cost savings have not been quantified, the CIRF concept is recommended as a lower LCC alternative.''
The third section should discuss the analysis methods and techniques. This section should include the assumptions and discuss any areas that were omitted. An example could be: "The cost of warranty repairs was excluded from this analysis." Comments on the adequacy of the methodology should also be included. Methodology that did not reflect the "real world" should also be discussed. For example: "The constant CIRF repair cycle time for all Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) did not reflect the prioritized repair of mission critical items."
The results part of the documentation should discuss the actual results in comparison to the expected results provided in the introduction. The numerical comparison of alternatives should also be provided. Explanations should be provided in terms that are understandable by managers who are not ordinarily familiar with quantitative analysis methods. Phrases such as, "This MTBF value has a two-sigma confidence level," will most likely be understood only by other analysts. A statement that, "This MTBF value has a 98 percent confidence level," is more understandable by program office managers.
The fifth section should identify all data sources. The degree of confidence in the accuracy of the data should be stated. Data elements that drive the results should be identified. Any action undertaken to improve the confidence in the accilracy of these sensitive data elements should also be provided. For example, "Based on 12 months of DO41 data for 6 bases, the high removal rate of the F-4 ejection seat was a major cost driver. However, observation and discussions with personnel at base X during a two week time period indicated that the ejection seat reliability was not a problem. Ninety percent (90%) of all seat removals were to gain access to the ARC-xyz radio located under the seat."
The sixth and last section of the documentation should address areas of future trade studies. These recommendations are based on new insights and understanding gained from the current study. Often these recommendations address limitations (e.g. data bases, methodology, etc.) due to constraints (time and/or budgetary).
Prime contractors usually conduct more than one study at a time, and complete many studies throughout the contractual effort. This section of the documented studies and analysis provided by prime contractors should identify specific subsystems and equipments to be emphasized in near term trade studies. Progress made in each of these areas as a result of trade studies to date should also be provided.
V. WRITING THE TASK ORDER/SOW
The following key ingredients need to be included in any task order or Statement of Work: 
Definition of the interim and final product(s)/documentation
Very few study managers have the background and training to accomplish the above entirely by themselves. Assistance from and co-ordination with reliability and maintainability engineers, the life cycle cost focal point, program control, and logisticians in the program office is usually beneficial.
VI. SUlMARY
The final product is useful only if the "questions being asked" are answered by reasonable assumptions and analysis. The reader of the final product should be able to understand the analysis and the inherent limitations. The following is a general list of "things to look for": 1) Is the cost element structure logical for the question(s) being asked/answered? Are all impacted cost elements included?
2) Do the high cost areas make sense? Does the distribution of cost reflect history? If not, then, why not?
3) What are the cost drivers for these high cost areas? What is the sensitivity of these high cost areas to variations in the cost drivers? Do other cost elements become significant (become high cost areas) as these cost drivers are varied? 4) Are the assumptions appropriate for the questions being addressed? If the assumptions drive the results, then where is the cross-over point where a different decision would be made? 5) Do the conclusions/recommendations answer the question(s)? Is sufficient detail provided to understand any limitations on the results? Are the recommendations logical/defensible in their intended "real world" application?
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